State of Domain Security 2026
We ran DNS-level security checks across a ranked sample of the most popular domains on the internet and aggregated the results. The picture: SPF is near-universal, but DMARC enforcement and DNSSEC remain minority practices even at the top of the web.
Based on DNS-level checks of 10,000 domains from the Tranco top-domains ranking.
The DMARC enforcement gap
Publishing a DMARC record is not the same as being protected. A record at p=none only monitors; it tells receivers to do nothing when a message fails. Of the 6,673 domains that publish DMARC, here is how the policy splits:
Share of domains that publish a DMARC record.
Adoption drops down the rankings
Security hygiene is concentrated at the very top. Each measure below is shown across four rank bands, from the top 1,000 down to rank 10,000. The gradient is the story: the further down the list, the rarer enforcement becomes.
Publishes DMARC
Enforces DMARC (quarantine or reject)
DNSSEC-signed
Publishes CAA
Who runs the internet’s email
Mail is highly concentrated. Among the 7,281 domains that publish MX records, a handful of providers handle most of it:
Share of domains with MX records, by mail provider.
Who runs the internet’s DNS
The same concentration shows up in authoritative DNS, classified from each domain’s name servers:
Share of all tested domains, by DNS provider.
Methodology
We took the top 10,000 domains from the Tranco ranking and resolved each one over public DNS, recording whether it publishes an SPF record, a DMARC record and its policy, a CAA record, and whether the zone is DNSSEC-signed (checked via a DNSKEY query over DNS-over-HTTPS). We also classified each domain’s name servers and mail exchangers to estimate provider market share. Every figure below is reported as a share of the domains we tested, with the denominator stated. We never single out an individual domain, and a detectable misconfiguration is not by itself a security verdict.
A caveat on reading this. These are aggregate measurements of public DNS configuration, not an audit of any one domain. A missing record is not proof of a vulnerability, and a present one is not proof of safety. We report only totals and segments, never individual domains.